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D.: Abstracts of Recent Cases
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

is chargeable for the hazards of such services. The aggravation
caused by the unskillful treatment 'of a doctor would not have
occurred if there had been no original injury and the aggravation
is regarded as the proximate result which naturally flows from the
original injury.
It is possible that the instant case may be cited as affirming
a limitation on the liability of the original tortfeasor for the subsequent repair of property. The problem of causation is one of
ascertaining the ambit of the risk created by the defendant. Pound,
Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1957). In the Cleary case, supra, the
court recognized that it is the probability of the occurrence of the
intervention of another conscious agent which is material. It is submitted that the test of liability should be foreseeability of the intervention and not whether it involves personal injury or property
damage.
A. G. H.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CONFmicr OF LAws-FULL FArrH AND CREDrr-JUDGMENT OF A

Sis= STAT.-DS, West Virginia residents, in purchasing a house

trailer, had given P, a Pennsylvania corporation, a promissory note
authorizing a confession of judgment in the event of a default of
payment. When Ds became delinquent in an installment, P's agent
requested that Ds sign a release on the trailer, and he orally promised
that such release would end the transaction between the parties.
After obtaining the signatures, P brought an action in Pennsylvania
on the note, and obtained a judgment against Ds pursuant to the provisions of the note. P then instituted an action in debt on the judgment in West Virginia. Upon the court's refusal to give the judgment
full faith and credit under U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4, because the judgment had been obtained through fraud, P appealed. Held, that a
judgment in a court of record of a sister state will not be given full
faith and credit where it is shown that the judgment was procured
through fraud. Consumer Credit Co. v. Bowerg, 104 S.E.2d 869
(W. Va. 1958).
The full faith and credit clause does not preclude a court from
impeaching the validity of the judgment of a sister state. Grover v.
Baker Sewing Machine Co., 137 U.S. 287 (1897); Bonnet-Brawn
Sales Service v. Utt, 323 Mo. 589, 19 S.W.2d 888 (1929).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1959

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 17
CASE COMMENTS

In determining whether a defense should bar recovery on the
judgment, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that the
only defenses which may be set up are those which would have
been available in the state where the judgment was obtained. Ward
v. Hunter Mach. Co., 263 Mich. 445, 248 N.W. 864 (1933).
RESTATEMEwNT, CoNFLAcr OF LAWs § 440 (1934), states the rule
as follows: "A valid foreign judgment for the payment of money
which was obtained by fraud will not be enforced if (a) equitable
defenses may be interposed in an action at law at the forum, and
(b) the fraud was of a character such as to constitute grounds for
equitable relief in the state where the judgment was rendered."

A few jurisdictions have enumerated those defenses which they
will allow as a bar to recovery without regard to the law of the state
where the judgment was rendered. Jeanette Glass Co. v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407 (1952) (the court listed lack of
jurisdiction, nut tiel record, and legal satisfaction as the only defenses available).

The West Virginia court in the instant case held that satisfaction prior to the entry of the judgment revokes the warrant of attorney to confess judgment and any judgment thereafter obtained is
done so through such fraud as to render the judgment void and open

to collateral attack. The court made no mention of whether fraud
is a bar to recovery in Pennsylvania where the judgment was obtained. This is contrary to the view followed by the majority of the
jurisdictions and seems to deny full faith and credit in that a defense
which would have been unavailable in the original action might be
allowed in the subsequent action.

ToRTs-REOVERY iFOR Fiu irr ANm SHOCK WrrHour

ImpACr.-D's

cattle wandered onto P's farm through a fence which D had negligently left open. One of D's bulls charged toward P but was diverted
before coming into contact with her. P collapsed and suffered an
attack of coronary insufficientcy. P brought suit against D for damages arising out of her fright and shock. Upon being nonsuited, she
appealed. Held, that there can be no recovery for injuries resulting
from freight or nervous shock unless they are accompanied by physical injury or physical impact. Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263
(Pa. 1958).
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This decision is in accord with a long line of Pennsylvania decisions denying recovery for fright or shock due to negligence where
there is no accompanying physical injury or impact. The impact or
injury is said to be required in order to prevent the courts from
being flooded by fraudulent claims.
The majority of jurisdictions, among which is West Virginia,
follows the rule that there can be a recovery for fright and shock
accompanied by physical injury even though there is no impact.
RFSTATFMiENT, TORTS § 313 (1938), has adopted this view. See
Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 86 S.E.2d
475 (1935); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 40'2 (1935); 52 AM. Jun. Torts §§ 76,

78, 83 (1944).
Only a small and shrinking minority now follows the rule that
an impact is required along with the injury in order for there to
be a recovery. And even in these jurisdictions the impact need only
be slight. PRossER, TORTS § 37 (2d ed. 1955).

CRmViAL LAw-STATUTE PROVIDING FOR TnANscmP'rs WrrHouT
CHARGE To INDIGENT PERSONS CONVICrED OF CamEs-PIGHT TO

CROSS-ExAmINATION.-Ds, after being convicted of felonies, gave
notice that they would petition for writs of error. Their petitions
requested -transcripts of the proceedings at the state's expense as
authorized by W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1955), which
provided for transcripts without charge to indigent persons convicted of a crime. The state objected and requested a right to crossexamine as to whether there was indigency, but no answer was filed
and no counter-affidavit was tendered. The court ordered that the
transcripts be issued and the state instituted this proceeding for a
writ of prohibition to prevent the order from being carried out.
Held, that where the state had notice but filed no answer or counteraffidavit, it was within the court's discretion to grant a hearing with
a right of cross-examination on the questions raised in the petitions. State v. Bosworth, 105 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1958).
The court in the instant case pointed out that the filing of the
affidavit by the defendants established a prima facie case that there
was indigency. The state could have overcome this presumption
during the hearing by showing through cross-examination that the
defendants were not in fact indigent. But where the state fails to
answer, the court may in its discretion deny such hearing and cross-
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examination without being guilty of an abuse of discretion which
would warrant a writ of prohibition.
For other cases dealing with W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 7, § 7
(Michie 1955), see Linger v. Jennings,99 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1957),
and Comment, 59 W. VA. L. Rlhv. 79 (1957).

BILLS AND NOTES-CoNDITIONAL DEL-ERY.-D executed and en-

trusted his promissory note negotiable in form to P which contained
blanks as to due date, sum, and date of payment. It was orally
agreed that the instrument was not to be operative until D notified
P of the acceptance of P's offer to install certain awnings. P without
authority completed the note and sued D thereon. D tendered instructions, which the court refused, to the effect that the condition
not having occurred, the instrument was never validly delivered.
Held, that if the evidence supported the allegation, it was error to
refuse the instruction. Leverett v. Awnings, Inc., 104 S.E.2d 686
(Ga. 1958).
It is settled law that evidence of a conditional delivery of a
promissory note may be established against one who does not qualify
as a holder in due course. This view was followed by the courts in
the majority of jurisdictions prior to and was later incorporated in
UNoRM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AcT § 16.
The parol evidence rule is inapplicable in this situation because
the evidence is offered to prove an absence of delivery rather than a
change in the terms of the instrument. See Annot., 54 A.L.R. 702

(1928).
For a discussion of conditional delivery see 10 C.J.S. Bills and

Notes § 79 (1938); 7 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes §§ 40, 41 (1937);
B~n-roN, BILs & NoTEs § 54 (1943).
L. S. D.
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